argue that there are better alternatives to the standard measure of years-since-birth. In fact, I claim that public policy would be better if age were more appropriately specified in the law. A particularly simple alternative to years since birth would be a measure of age based on mortality risk. Groups whose mortality risk is high would be considered old, those with low mortality risk would be classified as young and those with the same mortality risk would be considered to be the same age. Another closely related approach would be to measure age from the other end of life, at least in expected terms. That is, remaining life expectancy (RLE) would be the measure of age and those with a short RLE would be considered elderly and those with a long RLE would be considered young.
One advantage of the RLE approach is that it is measured in years, units that are widely understood unlike mortality risk which is measured in the percentage chance of dying within a year.
Even at a point in time, there are differences between the various ways of measuring age. For instance, RLE and mortality risk would reflect that a man at conventionally defined age of 65 is the roughly the same age as a woman of age 70. The population. The different measures will, for instance, give a very different answer to how many elderly people there will be in 2050. Later in the paper we will look at how these various ways of measuring age would apply to labor force participation and also how different old-age dependency ratios might look under the alternative approaches.
To the best of my knowledge, there isn't a large existing literature on alternative ways of measuring age. The paper that contains ideas most similar to mine was written by my Stanford colleague Victor Fuchs (1984) . In his paper, Victor discusses using remaining life expectancy as a better measure of age and noted that when Social Security was designed in 1935, the gender-blended remaining life expectancy at age 65 was 12.5 years. By 1984, those who had 12.5 years of remaining life expectancy were 72 years of age. Victor went on to say that if 65 was the appropriate entry age for being categorized as elderly in 1935, then the entry age for that status should have been 72 in 1984. Victor, thus, already had the idea of an alternative measure of age and suggested that "nominal ages" could or perhaps should be adjusted to "real ages" based on mortality or remaining life expectancy.
Another paper that is closely related is Cutler and Sheiner (2001) . The authors are concerned with the impact of demographic changes on medical spending both in the past and in future projections. They note that for acute care and nursing home care, demand is more a function of remaining life expectancy than it is of age. They also note the high medical costs associated with the last year of life and that, on average, the last year of life has been occurring at older and older ages. They don't quite reach the conclusion that I have -namely that age itself could be defined as something other than years-since-birth -but their analysis suggests the need for a new measure of age.
In order to get started, Figures 1 and 2 introduce the concept of mortality milestones, the first age at which men and women reach one, two, and four percent mortality risk. Figure 1 shows that in the year 2000, men first reached a mortality risk of one percent at age 58, they first reached a two percent mortality risk at age 65 and they reached the four percent milestone at age 73. The corresponding ages in 1970 were 51, 59, and 68. The figure says that 51 year-olds in 1970 and 58 year-olds in 2000 had the same mortality risk (1%), 59 year-olds in 1970 and 65 year-olds in 2000 similarly had the same mortality (2%), and 68 year-olds in 1970 had the same mortality risk as 73 yearolds in 2000. In just the thirty years between 1970 and 2000, the age at which one percent mortality is reached advanced seven years, the age at which two percent mortality risk is reached advanced six years and the age at which four percent is reached advanced five years. Any way you look at it, there was remarkable progress in age-specific mortality. A mortality-based age system would suggest that 59 year-old men in 1970 and 65 year-old men in 2000 were the same age. (Shoven, 2004) . Of course, the fact that reconciles these observations is that 75-year old women are younger than 75-year old men, at least according to an age system based mortality risk or remaining life expectancy.
Figures 1 and 2 also show that the rate of mortality progress was somewhat slower for women than for men, at least for the last thirty years of the twentieth century.
The age at which women first reach a one percent mortality risk went up four years between 1970 and 2000 (vs. seven yeas for men), the age at which mortality risk reaches two percent advanced two years for women (vs. six for men) and the age where four percent mortality is "achieved" advanced three years for women (vs. five years for men). The basic pattern has a positive interpretation. in 1965. This is consistent with a mild squaring of the survival curves and a concentration of high mortality in the last years of life.
How Much Aging Will Occur in the U.S. Population Between Now and 2050?
There probably is as much attention paid to the anticipated aging of the U.S. population and how the economy will adjust to it as any demographic fact. Some of the predictions of the aging of the population are simply due to the use of the conventional years-since-birth measure of age. Consider two alternative definitions of who is elderly in the population, those who are currently 65 or older and those who have a mortality risk of 1.5 percent or worse. Today, at least on a gender blended basis, the two definitions of elderly are equivalent, since the average mortality risk faced by 65 year-olds is 1.5 percent. However, going forward being 65+ and having a mortality risk of 1.5%+ will not be equivalent. Figure 7 tells the story. The Census Department predicts that the 65+ population will increase from about 12.5 percent of the population today to about 20.5 percent between 2035 to 2050. In 2050, Census predicts that the percent of the population that is elderly will continue to gradually increase. On the other hand, the percent of the population with mortality risks higher than 1.5 percent (currently also 12.5 percent of the population) never gets above 16.5 percent and is projected to be just slightly below 15 percent and declining by 2050. With the 65+ criterion, the fraction of the population that is classified as elderly is projected to grow by approximately 66 percent by 2050; whereas with the 1.5 percent and above mortality criterion, the fraction of the population classified as elderly is projected to grow by only 20 percent. The point is the great aging of our society is partly a straightforward consequence of how we measure age. Another interpretation of Figure 7 is that by 2050 there will be approximately six percent of the population that are over 65 years of age but who are young enough to have a mortality risk of less than 1.5 percent. By the standard criterion used today they would be classified as elderly but by any mortality based definition of who is elderly they would not. This naturally leads to the topic of labor force participation by age. If we look at male labor force participation by age with one of the two mortality based definitions of age, we get a somewhat different picture. Figures 9 and 10 plot male labor force participation by mortality risk and by remaining life expectancy, respectively. First, the figures show that with either mortality-based age measure, the fact that men are working more at older ages essentially disappears. In Figure 9 , we see that men of a st century. However, pension laws and programs feature lots of conventionally defined ages that have not been adjusted for improvements in mortality and life expectancy. For instance, the 59.5 age after which money can be withdrawn from tax deferred retirement accounts hasn't changed since it was introduced decades ago.
Similarly, the age of early eligibility for Social Security (62), the age of Medicare entitlement (65), and the age that one must begin withdrawing from tax deferred saving accounts (70.5) haven't changed in at least the past forty years, if ever. These critical ages will likely need to be adjusted if we expect much of the increase in life expectancy in the 21 st century to be devoted to work instead of retirement.
In a book I am writing with George Shultz, we calculate the difference in the total labor supply in the U.S. in 2050 between two scenarios: (1) people retire in the same pattern as they do today by conventionally defined ages, and (2) Figure 8 were to look like the 2005 one). We don't think of this 9.6 percent number as precisely estimated by any means -it might be eight percent or it might be ten percent.
On the other hand, 9.6 percent is our best estimate and we think that an increase in the size of the labor force by such a magnitude is rather enormous. The estimate takes account not only the change in the labor force participation by age under the two scenarios, but also takes account of the number of hours worked per week at different stages of the lifecycle. One way to think about it is that in one scenario, all labor force behavior (both work week and retirement) remains constant as a function of years since birth between now and 2050 and in the other scenario, all labor force behavior remains constant as a function of age, but in the second scenario, age is defined as remaining life expectancy. A simple Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function would suggest that 9.6 percent more labor would result in about seven percent more GDP, even if the extra labor was not accompanied with a larger capital stock. If investment were correspondingly higher so that the capital stock was also 9.6 percent higher in 2050 under the second scenario, then GDP could also be 9.6 percent higher. These figures of an extra seven to ten percent of GDP are worth pursuing, particularly given the forecasts of how much more we will be spending as a society on health care by 2050. The question is how to encourage people to balance work and retirement relative to their age and guide them on how to think of age.
There are lots of policies within Social Security, Medicare and the tax law that actually discourage long careers. In a paper co-authored with Gopi Shah Goda and Sita After completing the years that count (40 under reform one plus whatever increase comes from further increases in life expectancy), workers would achieve this new paid up status.
They would be exempt from all payroll taxes if they choose to work further. Today, most of these workers face a pure tax with no increase in benefits to offset the additional payroll taxes that they face for working. Under this reform, they would neither pay taxes nor improve their benefits from further work. The third reform we examined was to have all of the years that count (40), count the same. Currently, short careers are favored relative to long careers. For instance, someone who works for 17.5 years instead of 35 years at the same real indexed wage rate will get significantly more than half the benefits of the full career. Social Security uses the same formula to achieve progressivity that it uses to treat people with different career lengths. Effectively, those with less than full careers are treated as if they are lower income and benefit from the progressivity of the system. There is a relatively simple fix for confounding these two effects. Progressivity can be set in terms of the average salary earned over the years worked. If one works a full career (35 years under current law, 40 under the first reform we examine), then the progressive formula would be used to calculate monthly benefits. However, if one works less than a full career, benefits would be reduced proportionately. A twenty year career would generate half of the benefits of a forty year career under the proposed reform. All of these proposals could be implemented in such a way as to preserve average benefits at today's levels.
The impact of the three proposals would be a rather dramatic change in the net payroll tax from continued work. The current law has long-career people facing a 10.4 percent payroll tax, whereas short career people actually face a Social Security wage subsidy. What is going on is that Social Security is a net subsidy (the extra benefits are worth more than the extra payroll taxes) as long as you remain on the first segment (the 90 percent segment) of the PIA-AIME formula. When you work enough to "graduate" onto the second segment of the PIA formula (the 32 percent section), you face an immediate 10 percentage point jump in marginal tax rates. Those relatively high income people who work long careers and "graduate" to the third segment of the PIA formula (the 15 percent segment) face yet another 3 percent jump in marginal tax rates. Finally, once the additional work stops qualifying in the "high 35" aspect of the PIA formula, the payroll tax becomes simply a tax with no offsetting benefit increases. All of these facts are shown on the left hand graph in Figure 11 . Our concern is that those with long careers face high marginal tax rates while those with short careers are subsidized. The three relatively simple reforms that we examine change everything in terms of work incentives, as shown on the right hand side of the graph. All of the jumps are eliminated as is the predominate fact of increasing marginal tax rates for those with longer careers.
To us, it makes sense to try to level the playing field for those with long careers. 
Conclusion
The current practice of measuring age as years-since-birth, both in common practice and in the law, rather than alternative measures reflecting a person's stage in the lifecycle distorts important behavior such as retirement, saving, and the discussion of dependency ratios. Two alternative measures of age have been explored, mortality risk and remaining life expectancy. With these alternative measures, the huge wave of elderly forecast for the first half of this century doesn't look like a huge wave at all. By conventional 65+ standards, the fraction of the population that is elderly will grow by about 66 percent. However, the fraction of the population that is above a mortality rate that corresponds to 65+ today will grow by only 20 percent. Needless to say, the aging of the society is a lot less dramatic with the alternative mortality-based age measures.
In a separate application of age measurement, I examined the consequences of stabilizing labor force participation by age with alternative age definitions. If labor force participation were to remain as it is today with respect to remaining life expectancy (i.e.
if the length of retirement stayed where it is today) rather than labor force participation remaining fixed by conventionally-defined age, then there would be 9.6 percent more total labor supply by 2050 in the United States. This additional labor supply would be very helpful in terms of meeting the challenges of financing entitlement programs among other things. GDP might be almost ten percent higher by 2050 if retirement lengths stabilize. Several policies were examined that would encourage longer work careers.
It is my opinion that the allocation of the extra lifetime in the 21 st century cannot and will not continue the pattern of the 20 th century -namely all extra adult lifetime is taken as retirement. Even average retirement ages today look like early retirement when age is measured by remaining life expectancy or mortality risk. In order to allow people to choose when to retire without encouraging an early departure from the workforce, many ages in the laws should be indexed for demographic changes. It is time to consider a new way to measure age.
